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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the feasibility of outsourcing tax audit work in Malaysian tax system to enhance administration 
efficiency, to curb tax evasion and abusive avoidance, and to improve revenue collection without introducing a new tax. 
The current tax audit, carried out by internal auditors of Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, could only be performed 
on a small numbers of taxpayers due to high administrative cost in terms of audit cost and cost to employ and train more 
audit personnel. Nevertheless, without tax audit, tax non-compliance activity could not be curbed and government would 
be at high risk of losing its revenue. One of the possible ways to increase audit work is through strategic outsourcing. 
However, decision to outsource tax work should be critically examined because outsourcing of tax audit is a policy that 
could potentially affect every taxpayer. This paper discusses the views of the stakeholders (tax authorities, the taxpayers 
and tax agents) on the value of tax audit outsourcing. Using a mixed method approach, this study finds contradicting 
opinions on the idea of implementing external tax audit in Malaysia. While the tax authorities are hesitant to the idea, 
the companies as tax payers and the tax agents show favorable responds to the implementation of outsourced tax audit 
in Malaysia. 
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini mengkaji kesesuaian penggunaan penyumberan luar audit cukai dalam sistem percukaian di Malaysia untuk 
meningkatkan kecekapan pentadbiran, menyekat pengelakan dan pelarian cukai serta meningkat pendapatan tanpa perlu 
memperkenal cukai baru. Audit cukai semasa yang dijalankan oleh juruadit dalaman Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri 
Malaysia hanya boleh dilaksanakan ke atas sebilangan kecil pembayar cukai disebabkan kos pentadbiran yang tinggi 
merangkumi kos menjalankan audit dan kos menggaji dan melatih juruaudit baru. Walau bagaimanpun, tanpa audit 
cukai, aktiviti ketidakpatuhan cukai tidak akan dapat dibendung dan pihak kerajaan akan menanggung risiko kehilangan 
pendapatan yang tinggi. Salah satu cara untuk menambah bilangan audit adalah melalui penyumberan luar strategik. 
Namun, keputusan untuk memperkenalkan penyumberan luar audit cukai perlu diteliti kerana ia merupakan satu polisi 
yang boleh memberikan kesan kepada semua pembayar cukai. Artikel ini menggarap pandangan pemegang taruhan 
(pentadbir cukai, pembayar cukai dan agen cukai) terhadap nilai penyumberan luar audit cukai. Dengan menggunakan 
gabungan kaedah penyelidikan, kajian ini mendapati terdapat pendapat yang berbeza terhadap ide melaksanakan 
penyumberan luar audit cukai di Malaysia. Walaupun pentadbir cukai didapati kurang menyokong idea ini, syarikat 
sebagai pembayar cukai serta agen cukai didapati memberi respon yang positif terhadap pelaksanaan penyumberan 
luar audit cukai di Malaysia.
Kata kunci: Penyumberan luar; cukai pendapatan; audit cukai; pematuhan cukai; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia’s income heavily depends on the tax revenue 
in sustaining the economic stability and development. 
Annual Report of the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
(IRBM) shows that the tax revenue is the main source to the 
Malaysia income especially contributed by the collection 
of direct taxes. In 2010 alone, the revenue generated from 
direct taxes was RM86.50 billion. This figure was 53.35 
percent of the total federal government revenue (Inland 
Revenue Board Malaysia 2010). From the total amounts of 
the direct taxes, the main contributor comes from corporate 
taxes with 50.64 percent from the total direct taxes. This 
percentage shows the importance of corporate taxes in 
contributing to the Malaysia’s tax revenue.
In order to maintain this performance, tax audit 
becomes a core activity of IRBM to enhance voluntary 
compliance among taxpayers. IRBM is trying to enhance 
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tax compliance through tax audit so that taxpayers either 
individuals or corporate will not escape from paying their 
taxes. The main objective of tax audit is to encourage 
taxpayers to voluntarily report the true tax liabilities in 
accordance to the tax laws. It is also an approach to educate 
and expose taxpayers towards their responsibilities and 
obligations as stated in Income Tax Act 1967. 
Although tax audit has become one of the main 
objectives of IRBM, IRBM’s Annual Report 2010 shows that 
some of the selected audit cases could not be resolved. For 
example, in 2009, out of the 13,619 cases being selected 
for audit, only 7,942 cases were resolved; while in 2010, 
from 15,813 cases audited only 8,119 were resolved. This 
statistic suggests that the current practice of tax audit is 
not sufficient to solve audit cases and tax administration 
problems. In addition, the problem on tax audit becomes 
more severe after the self-assessment system was 
introduced in 2001 for corporate tax because of the lack 
of competent tax audit officers. Thus, the aim to audit 
all taxpayers will not be achieved and the tax revenue 
collection for the country will be negatively affected 
(Pertubuhan Berita Nasional Malaysia 2006). Introducing 
a new tax should be the last alternative as a new tax is 
associated with a loss of individual freedom to dispose 
of one’s own money the way one wishes (Williamson 
& Wearing 1996), thus would create resistance from the 
citizen and consequently would affect the popularity of 
that particular government (Kirchler 1997).
However, IRBM has to bear a high administration cost 
if it intends to audit all taxpayers. (Kamdar 1997). One of 
the possible ways to increase tax audit work is through 
strategic outsourcing. However, decision to outsource tax 
work should be critically examined because outsourcing 
of tax audit is a policy that could potentially affect every 
taxpayer, therefore many factors should be considered. 
As stated by Cross (1995), good outsourcing decisions 
can result in lower costs and increased competitive 
advantage, whereas poorly made outsourcing decisions 
can lead to a variety of problems such as increased costs, 
disrupted service and even organization failure. Previous 
research has acknowledged the effectiveness of tax 
audit outsourcing by providing evidence on higher tax 
compliance in countries where outsourcing is mandated 
(Lin 2000; Sen & Bala 2002).
This paper discusses the possibility of outsourcing 
the tax audit works from the views of its stakeholders 
namely tax authority, taxpayers and tax agents. The rest of 
the paper is organized in the following manner. The next 
section discusses the literature review on the outsourcing 
of tax works as practice by many countries including 
Malaysia. The literature review continues in the second 
section focusing on the tax audit outsourcing practices in 
other countries. The third section discusses the possibility 
of outsourcing tax audit in Malaysia based on interviews 
with tax authorities in Malaysia and surveys on companies 
and tax agents. Finally, the conclusion and limitation of 
this study are presented.
TAX SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA
Tax system in Malaysia follows a rather standard tax 
regime that is also practiced in most of its counterpart 
nations in the Asian region. Currently, taxes are levied 
to individuals and corporations in the forms of tax on 
occupational income, business income and investment 
income. Income tax in Malaysia is imposed only on 
income that is generated from Malaysian source except for 
banking, shipping, air transport and insurance industries 
where the global income rule is applied.
The country has implemented current year assessment 
since 2000 followed by self-assessment system in 2001. 
Under current year assessment, income earned during the 
basis period is taxed in that particular basis year. Thus, 
income received by the taxpayers is an after-tax income. 
However, due to multiple incomes received, different 
regulation applied to a particular income, and reliefs and 
rebates available, taxpayers are required to submit the 
final tax computations and pay the remaining tax liabilities 
after deducting the amount of tax paid earlier. This process 
by which taxpayers are required by law to determine the 
taxable income, calculate the tax liability and submit their 
tax returns based on tax laws, policies and guidelines 
issued by IRBM is known as a self-assessment system.
The IRBM has been given the authority to administer 
and regulate the laws, as passed by Parliament to ensure 
that they are carried into effect and to make the tax system 
works. The main purpose of its existence is to secure and 
collect revenue incomes for the government. In achieving 
this purpose, IRBM has engaged in many activities in 
promoting high level of tax compliance in Malaysia such 
as continuous tax education programs designed to provide 
exposure and awareness on taxation laws to IRBM’s clients 
and future taxpayers. Besides educating the taxpayers, 
IRBM provides a forum to inform and update clients on 
their rights and responsibilities as taxpayers in order to 
increase the rate of voluntary tax compliance (IRBM 2010). 
Implementing an effective tax audit program serves as a 
key factor in ensuring that the level of tax compliance 
continues to improve and that taxpayers comply with 
the provisions of applicable tax laws and regulations, 
particularly within the environment of a self-assessment 
system.
Tax audit is the audit of a taxpayer’s accounting and 
other documentary evidences for the preparation of current 
tax returns. Tax audit in Malaysia is performed by internal 
tax auditors of the IRBM. Since companies in Malaysia are 
required to be audited by independent auditors under the 
Companies Act 1965, tax audit has become an extension 
of the “attest function” of the historical financial audit. 
In fact, only if the records and accounts produced by the 
taxpayer are insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of 
ascertaining his income, the Director General of IRBM may 
require that the taxpayer produces accounts audited by a 
professional accountant together with a report made by the 
accountant as stipulated in of the Companies Act 1965.
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 According to Tax Audit Framework of IRBM (2007), 
tax audit is defined as an examination of a taxpayer’s 
business records and financial affairs to ascertain that the 
amount of tax due are reported and paid in accordance with 
tax laws and regulations. The main objective of the tax 
audit as stated in the framework is to encourage voluntary 
compliance with the tax laws and regulations and to ensure 
that a higher tax compliance rate is achieved under the 
self-assessment system. It is also one of the measures 
undertaken by IRBM to educate and create awareness of 
taxpayers towards their rights and responsibilities under 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1967.
However, the current tax audit could only be 
performed on a small numbers of taxpayers. Administrative 
cost in terms of audit cost and cost to employ and train 
more audit personnel have increased significantly since 
the adoption of self-assessment system. Nevertheless, 
without tax audit, tax non-compliance activity could not 
be curbed and government would be at a high risk of 
losing its revenue.
OUTSOURCING OF TAX WORKS
Outsourcing is referred to as a service requiring a contract 
with external party (Sanders et al. 2007) to provide 
products or services that could also be provided internally 
(Carey et al. 2006) and that it can give mutual benefits 
to the organization and the outsourced company (Juma’h 
et al. 1999). Similarly, Lee (2001) defines outsourcing as 
the process of turning over part or all of organization’s 
functions to external service provider(s).
Outsourcing allows organizations to grow without 
investing in fixed assets, whether equipment, plants or 
personnel. By contracting the outside service providers 
especially on the activities viewed as secondary to their 
core business, organizations may simultaneously reduce 
their costs and at the same time maintain, or even improve, 
the quality of their outputs. However, outsourcing activity 
is also accompanied by a number of risks as well especially 
when it is the core function that is being outsourced 
(Selim & Yiannakas 2004; Peursem & Jiang 2008). Poor 
outsourcing practices can lead to an unintended loss of 
operational-level knowledge and thus, create dependence 
on the contractor. The outsourced contractor will have 
access to company assets and this would be a concern 
particularly if the company’s information is confidential 
(Power, Bonifazi & Desouza 2004).
Outsourcing of tax work is not new especially 
amongst CPAs in United States. The tax activity commonly 
outsourced is the preparation of tax returns for companies 
or individual tax payers. CPA firms note that outsourcing 
the tax return preparation offers several potential benefits 
to their companies. It frees tax professionals’ time from 
performing perfunctory duties such as form filing and 
data entry. The time saved can be used more productively 
on tax and estate planning. Tax outsourcing also lessens 
the need for temporary professional staff during the peak 
season as recruiting new accounting staff is increasingly 
competitive. Furthermore, outsourcing tax-preparation 
services especially to overseas can also improve service 
by speeding the delivery of completed returns. The use of 
web-based system would significantly reduce the volume 
of stored paper files.
In the US, the collection of tax is also outsourced 
in certain states. After a comprehensive review of the 
previous practices, in 2004, the US government through 
specific legislation allows its IRS to use private debt 
collection companies and private law firms to collect 
delinquent taxes (Resnick 2005). Despite there are 
many who strongly opposed the legislation, the Bush 
administration has strongly supported the implementation 
of a permanent program for the collection of tax debts. 
According to Resnick (2005), the collection of revenue 
by private debt collectors exist in the early history of the 
US. These collectors were a class of agents authorized 
in 1798 and they received a percentage of the money 
collected. In 1873, the activity was discontinued when 
investigation by Congress found that such contracts were 
improper. However, the issue reappeared when the federal 
government loses millions of dollars of potential revenue 
as a result of its failure to collect delinquent taxes each 
year. The IRB’s inability to enforce debt collection does not 
only result in the lost revenue from the due debts but also 
increases lost revenue from future tax collection. Voluntary 
compliance is undermined when taxpayers believe that 
they can get away with not paying their taxes.
Earlier in 1995, the US Congress approved a pilot 
program to test the use of private law firms and debt 
collection agencies to help collect delinquent tax debts. 
This pilot program however fail to reap any financial 
benefits for the IRS, and the IRS cited lost-opportunity costs 
of about $17 million because it had to move collection 
personnel off line to work on the pilot (Resnick 2005). 
The failure was attributed to many reasons mainly 
the IRS’s legal interpretation, difficulty in identifying, 
selecting and transmit cases to the contractors, and lack 
of performance measures in transferring techniques and 
practices employed by private collectors to IRS’s own 
collection practices.
A similar approach is also employed in the collection 
of indirect taxes. Under the Uniform Sales and Use Tax 
Administration Act of the US, engaging an agent known 
as a certified service provider (CSP) to collect tax is also 
possible in many states. The collection of indirect taxes 
in the regulating states such as Nebraska is outsourced to 
CSP. A CSP is an agent of a seller with whom the CSP has 
contracted for the collection and remittance of sales and 
use taxes (Moore 2003).
Another outsourcing activity of tax work is the tax 
audit. Country such as Taiwan has outsourced successfully 
the tax audit function to independent public accountants 
(Lin 2000). This external tax audit is performed on selected 
companies based on their sizes. Other countries such as 
the US (Cameron et al. 2004), Pakistan (Sidiki 2010) and 
India (Sen & Bala 2002) have also implemented external 
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tax audit but the outsourced functions are tailored to the 
countries’ needs and methods.
In an effort to increase efficiency in data management 
and document processing, the IRB of Malaysia also engages 
in outsourcing activity. When Malaysia introduced the 
self-assessment system in 2001 and started to use e-filling 
system, there was a period of transition that allows the 
taxpayers to submit their tax forms manually if they are 
not capable to use internet filing. The work of uploading 
the manual data into the system through a process known 
as imaging and data capture are outsourced to a private 
company. The hand writing, typed or printed web forms 
are converted into electronic form that will be used 
for intelligent data capture that includes proofing and 
verification stages, resulting in a high level of accuracy 
in the data capture and conversion process. The IRBM 
also outsources some of its IT projects due to lack of 
certain in-house expertise and cost effectiveness. Some 
of the outsourced tasks are operations and infrastructure, 
communications and a few applications development. In 
order to ensure the project success, selected IRBM officers 
are attached to the outsourced project to enable effective 
and timely deliverables, efficient project monitoring, 
knowledge sharing and securing the confidentiality of 
internal information (IRBM 2011).
TAX AUDIT OUTSOURCING
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX AUDIT AND 
COMPLIANCE
Past studies suggest that the possibility of being audited 
by tax authorities is a significant factor determining the 
level of a firm’s compliance (Rice & Slemrod 1992; 
Kamdar 1997). The group of companies under the tight 
control of law such as banks and financial institutions has 
a higher compliance rate compared to companies that are 
not controlled by laws since these companies are always 
monitored and audited by the authorities. Accordingly, 
Rice and Slemrod (1992) conclude that the decision 
regarding company’s taxes that need to be reported to tax 
authorities was made based on the tax liabilities, penalties 
for possibilities being traced due to under-reporting 
income, and probabilities of being audit.
By using cross sectional data from 1977 to 1985, 
Dubin and Wilde (1990) support that tax rate and audit 
rate have significant deterrence effects on noncompliance. 
According to Beck et al. (1991) tax compliance improve 
when penalty rate and probability audited increase, but no 
tax rate effect on tax compliance. Kamdar (1997) in his 
study using time series analysis finds that tax audit rate 
has a positive and significant relation with tax compliance. 
By studying the effect of tax schemes on reported income, 
Collins and Plumlee (1991) discover that tax audit can 
reduce underreported income notwithstanding the schemes 
used. The findings from other researchers such as Alm 
et al. (1992) also reveal that taxpayers will report high 
taxable income with aggressive tax audit and penalty. 
A more recent study by Hoopes, Mescall and Pittman 
(2012) provides more evident that corporate tax avoidance 
decreases with stricter tax administrator monitoring. 
Their study shows that with an increase probability of 
being audited, the firms’ effective tax rates increase. This 
suggests that US public firms undertake less aggressive tax 
positions when tax enforcement is stricter. Similarly, an 
increase in enforcement activities by the tax administrator 
is also associated with an improvement in financial 
reporting quality evidence from a better mapping of 
accruals to cash flow (Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff 2012).
In practical, it is difficult for tax authorities to 
capture a complete and accurate assessment of what is 
owed. The goal of the revenue agent is to look beyond 
the superficial appearance as presented in the tax forms 
and the supporting documentation. Since financial records 
can be forged and manipulated, so the revenue agent 
must adopt a skeptical stance by performing audit on the 
firms (Pentland & Carlile 1996). From the government 
perspective, tax audit plays an important role in safe 
guarding what to be the government revenue to finance its 
activities. As citizens, we are obliged to provide financial 
support for the activities of our government through 
tax payment. As pointed by Clotfelter (1983), tax non-
compliance not only create losses to government revenue 
but also depicts the ignorant attitude of citizens toward 
their responsibilities and worst of all it signifies a threat 
to voluntary compliance. 
The need for tax audit lies on the fact that the tax 
payers and the tax authority have different and conflicting 
financial interest on the relevant information in the income 
tax return. Manipulation or misstatement of information 
in the tax return may reduce tax liability to the preparer 
but consequently may also reduce revenue to the tax 
authority. Frequent tax audits can improve companies’ fair 
and exemplary taxation habits but also violate tax payers’ 
rights and further increase administration’s financial 
burden. Moreover, frequent tax audits are accompanied 
by growing demand in budget and human resources. 
Therefore, tax audit could only be performed on a small 
numbers of taxpayers. In 2005, only 1.84 percent of 
Korean companies received a corporate tax audit, a figure 
that was 0.81 percent higher than the United States but 
much lower than Japan’s 4.94 percent during the same 
period (Hyeon-ji 2007). In Malaysia, there were 2.9 
percent of companies that were audited and resolved in 
2009 and 2010.
TAX AUDIT OUTSOURCING IN OTHER COUNTRIES
In Taiwan, financial information of medium and big 
companies together with its related tax form must be tax-
audited (Lin 2000). The outsourcing of tax audit work to 
independent CPA is an effort to reduce the workload of the 
tax authorities in Taiwan, and to assist firms in meeting 
their tax obligation. Article 102 of Taiwan’s Income Tax 
Law prescribes that a firm may entrust a certified public 
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accountant to prepare, attest and file its business income 
returns. In preparing an attested tax return, the entrusted 
CPA is responsible for checking the firm’s accounting 
records and related documentary evidence, adjusting the 
accounting income to taxable income based on the tax 
law, and attaching a signed ‘tax return attestation report’ 
to the tax return.
As an encouragement, for those firms whose tax 
returns are attested by a CPA, the law provides various 
tax incentives including additional deductibility of 
entertainment expenses, the carry forward of net losses, 
and an extension of filing dateline. While there are certain 
specific firms that are required by the tax law to use CPA 
attested tax returns, other firms can also elect to use CPA 
attested returns and thus enjoy those tax advantages made 
available as a means of encouraging tax attestation. Lin 
(2000) examines the results of the tax audit made by tax 
inspectors about the two kinds of returns declarations, tax 
and non-tax audited by certified accountant. Empirically, 
Lin (2000) demonstrates that Taiwan attested tax returns 
are more compliant with the tax law than non-attested 
tax returns, and therefore suggests that the tax authorities 
should continue to promote the use of attested tax returns 
by the certified public accountant. However, the attestation 
system is not widely employed by firms in Taiwan even 
though there are many incentives and tax advantages 
attached to that system. In 1994, CPA attested returns only 
accounted for 8.2% of all tax returns reported or a ratio of 
approximately 12:1 in favor of non-attested returns (Lin 
2000). Lacks of enforcement such as no penalty exist for 
non-compliance to attestation requirement may contribute 
to the low compliance activities.
Similarly, in the United States, states such as Florida 
and Texas currently have optional privatization of state 
sales tax audit programs that allow CPAs to compete 
directly for sales tax audit services (Cameron et al. 2004). 
This program allows businesses to hire certified auditors 
to audit their sales tax compliance in lieu of subjection 
to an audit by the state and transfer the actual delivery of 
services from governmental units to the private sector. The 
sales tax function is traditionally performed by auditors 
employed by the state government with audits conducted 
under internal rules prescribed by the state. By outsourcing 
this function, accountants are allowed to compete in the 
market place for the opportunities to provide the audit 
service.
Some countries such as Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh, the government engages CPAs to carry out 
tax audit on a certain taxpayers identified by the tax 
administrators. The Federal Board of Revenue Pakistan 
has decided to hold audit of taxpayer companies through 
external auditors or chartered accountant firms in 2010 
(Sidiki 2010). In India, tax audit was introduced with 
effect from 1 April 1984 for every person carrying on 
business or profession having total sales, turnover or gross 
receipts exceeding the specified limit. The maximum 
period of audit is four months and should be articulated 
by means of prescribed form for audit report and related 
statements (Sen & Bala 2002). Likewise, Sen and Bala 
(2002) propose that Bangladesh, which has a low taxes 
to GDP ratio that indicates lack of ability to tap resources 
from a growing economy, to exercise the practice of tax 
audit as prescribed under section 35(3) and section 82 of 
the Income Tax Ordinance.
In general practices, outsourcing the tax audit does 
not eliminate the need for tax audit by the tax authorities. 
However, the tax audit performed by an independent CPA 
is believed to enhance the reliability of the information 
submitted to the tax authority in measuring tax obligation 
of the companies. The tax authorities at their discretion 
may perform counter-audit on the attested return if they 
have any reason to do so or just as the normal routine audit 
procedure by random selection.
Even though company in Malaysia is allowed to 
engage a tax agent to help in its tax matters, the role of 
tax agent as prescribed by ITA 1967 is only to help the 
taxpayers in preparing their income tax returns based on 
the information given by the taxpayers. It does not serve 
the purpose of expressing an opinion as to the fairness 
of the accounts examined by the auditor, or to certify the 
financial statements for the tax purposes. Therefore, no 
opinion about the degree of correspondence between the 
information contained in the tax return and the regulatory 
provisions of tax laws is provided.
METHODOLOGY
This study is carried out to find out stakeholders’ views on 
the possibility of outsourcing tax audit in Malaysia. This 
study adopts a concurrent mixed method design approach. 
In providing a comprehensive analysis based on multiple 
viewpoints, the application of mixed methodologies is 
appropriate. Furthermore, this study has many distinct 
target groups of respondents; companies, tax agents 
and tax administrators from IRBM. Two methods are 
performed in the collection of data; in-depth interviews 
on tax administrators, and surveys on companies and tax 
agents.
The respondents for the in-depth interviews comprise 
the top management team from IRBM selected based on 
purposive sampling technique. The respondents were 
selected because of their positions as directors or deputy 
director general of IRBM. A total of four respondents 
participated in the interviews. They were interviewed 
individually and each interview lasted for about 40 
minutes to an hour. The interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and analyzed using NVivo 7 software.
The sample for the survey consists of two groups 
of respondents; tax agents and companies. There were a 
total of 864 tax agents operating in Selangor and Federal 
Territory according to the IRBM website. Of this, a total of 
265 tax agents were sampled for this study. For companies, 
samples selected were small and medium sized companies. 
A total of 285 companies were selected to participate in 
this study.
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The multiple methods of collecting data will allow 
triangulation of data in the study that can yield a more 
meaningful basis of answering the research question and 
more compelling information to support the research 
conclusion and recommendation.
POSSIBILITY OF OUTSOURCING TAX AUDIT IN MALAYSIA
The study is premised on outsourcing literature since it 
involves an outsourcing arrangement whereby a third party 
is introduced to the relationship between taxpayers and 
the tax authority. Engaging external party other than the 
tax authority to perform the federal tax audit work also 
falls under the concept of outsourcing since it involves a 
third party external to the organization. Various factors 
including benefits and risks of outsourcing need to be 
considered before adopting this new service. This is 
important to ensure proper implementation of the new 
service.
The results of the study are discussed in two separate 
topics based on the similar data collected; interview on 
tax administrators’ views and surveys on companies’ and 
tax agents’ views.
TAX ADMINISTRATORS’ VIEWS
We carried out interviews on four top executive positions 
in IRB of Malaysia. These executives are responsible in 
every decision made by their divisions and report directly 
to Director General of Inland Revenue of Malaysia. The 
interviews took a period of about one to one and a half 
hour at the executives’ offices. In general, the results of the 
interviews are not inclined towards the idea of outsourcing 
the tax audit works. In the interviews, the arguments on 
risks associated with outsourcing activities overshadow 
the benefits that could be gained from this activity. The 
arguments against outsourcing are presented in three areas: 
statutory, economic and policy.
Statutory Arguments  The tax authorities believe that 
the current companies’ tax returns submitted to them 
are sufficient enough to present the fair view of the 
companies’ tax position.
“…We believe our tax payers, so we need to minimize the 
proportion of companies being audited to gain public trust. If the 
tax payers willingly submitted their tax returns, we should not 
intervene because if we do, they will not trust us in the future” 
(Respondent 1) 
Currently, under section 174(1) and (2) of the 
Companies Act 1965, financial statements audit of 
companies is mandated for every company in Malaysia 
including the small and medium size businesses. In 
submitting their tax returns, most of the companies submit 
together the audited financial statements. According 
to the director, if the tax return is subjected to another 
external audit even though for different purposes, it 
will be redundant. Since most companies have their 
financial statements audited by the independent auditors, 
so the tax returns are also prepared based on the audited 
financial statements. The fact that the financial statements 
submitted to IRBM have been audited financially, thus 
cause redundancy is also commented by the other two 
directors.
However, there is no requirement to submit audited 
financial statements under the Income Tax Act 1965. 
Section 82(5) of the Act only requires companies to submit 
audited financial statements if the Director General of 
IRBM believes that the accounts or records produced by the 
tax payers are insufficient or inadequate for that purpose. 
Specifically, Section 82(5) prescribes as follows:
“Director General, if he is of the opinion that any accounts or 
records produced by any person to the Director General for the 
purpose of ascertaining the income of a person are insufficient 
or inadequate for that purpose, may by notice under his hand 
require that person to produce, in respect of any period or periods 
specified in the notice and within a time so specified (that time 
not being less than thirty days from the service of the notice), 
accounts audited by a professional accountant together with a 
report made by that accountant which shall contain, in so far as 
they are relevant, the matters set out in section 174(1) and (2) 
of the Companies Act 1965.”
The interviews reveal that most of the companies 
either employ in-house tax experts or engage tax 
consultants, tax agents or tax advisors to prepare their tax 
returns. Under section 153(3) of the Act, tax agent means 
any professional accountant or person, approved by the 
Minister of Finance to act on behalf of any person for 
any of the purposes of the Act. However, the role of these 
tax agents is only to help the taxpayers in preparation of 
submission of tax returns. If any act of non-compliance is 
detected during audit, the taxpayer is liable since the agent 
only prepares the tax returns based on the information 
given by the taxpayer.
Economic Arguments  Corbett (2004) identifies that 
cost saving is the main reason an organization chooses 
whether to use outsourcing service for its activity. For 
example, tax authorities in USA appoint private tax 
collection agency service to collect tax return on behalf 
of government in order to overcome high collection 
costs after the government suffers lost from that activity 
(Braunchli 2008). Meanwhile, expertise, experience, and 
qualification offered by external auditor encourage most 
organization to use external auditor to operate their internal 
audit in public firms (Carey et al. 2006).
However, in the government organization such as 
the IRBM, the revenue collected is not for the limited 
shareholders such as in the public firms. Therefore, one of 
the concerns of the tax authority is the role of the external 
tax auditors. Whose interest will they protect; taxpayers 
or the government? Since IRBM has the responsibility 
to assess and collect revenue to finance the government 
expenditure, every single cent of tax raised belongs to the 
government. If the external auditor is an audit firm, a profit 
making organization, then its interest is questionable as 
pointed by one of the director;
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“…if you outsource (the tax audit), this outsource company will 
have to be a government linked company (GLC). Not to the profit 
making company. I don’t think so, because the ultimate aim (of 
IRBM) is to get money for the country, for the government. GLC 
may be. Company under ROC (Registrar of Company), I don’t 
think because their aim is always profit motive.”
(Respondent 4)
Another director commented on the same issue, 
“Breach of trust is also present in audit. That means, there 
is no guarantee… When public pays for the service, of 
course they want some tax saving.” The concern over the 
issue of safeguarding the national income is raised quite 
many times by these directors. Their concerns might be 
justifiable since a few research reveal that auditors become 
more lenient towards the client’s preferred accounting 
method when they report a high level of motivation to 
avoid conflict with client (Koch, Weber & Wustemann 
2009).
The cost of audit is also one of the economic concerns 
raised in the interviews. If the external tax audit is 
implemented, who will bear the cost? According to the 
directors interviewed, the IRBM unquestionably will not 
bear the cost. Among the pledges of the IRBM directors are 
to collect the amount of taxes due according to the laws 
of the country and to instil public trust in the fairness and 
excellence of the tax administration. One of the directors 
argued;
“…we (IRBM) are not going to pay because we already raise the 
amount of tax. In our pledge, we are going to collect not one 
cent more or not one cent less. So, if we are going to outsource 
(the tax audit), who is going to bear the cost?”
(Respondent 1)
The cost of external audit should not be an extra 
burden to the taxpayers since the taxpayers have suffered 
multiple cost of compliance under the self-assessment 
regime. The costs include the cost incurred by individuals 
in acquiring sufficient knowledge to meet their legal 
obligations, the cost of compiling the necessary receipts 
and other records and of completing tax returns; payment 
to professional tax advisers and return preparers; and 
incidental coats of postage, telephone, and travel in order 
to communicate with advisors or tax authorities (Turner, 
Smith & Gurd 1998).
The extensive use of tax preparers should not be 
taken lightly. Previous studies on relationship between tax 
preparers and clients show that in general professionally 
prepared tax returns have lower tax liabilities than 
individually prepared returns (Christian, Gupta & Lin 
1997; Stephenson 2007) and some evidence suggests that 
the lower tax liability is associated with increased non-
compliance or aggressive tax planning.
Another economic consideration concerns public 
jobs. The outsourcing of tax audit would seem like 
replacing the government paid employees with private 
paid employees. Section 134, ITA 1967 prescribes that the 
care and management of the tax shall be on the Director 
General of Inland Revenue. The Director General may 
delegate certain functions but only to the public officers or 
employees of the IRBM (section 136, ITA 1967). Results of 
the interviews reveal that efforts are being made by IRBM 
to improve field-auditing skills of all auditors via training, 
with the hope that a higher coverage is more readily 
achieved with increase in auditors’ level of competency.
Policy Arguments  Is the outsourcing of the tax audit 
a sound public policy? Implementation of the external 
tax audit is a policy that could potentially affect many 
taxpayers, therefore factors other than statutory and 
economic advantages should also be considered. One of 
the concerns is the privacy and security risk of revealing 
confidential client information to the third parties. This risk 
of outsourcing has been discussed by many researchers 
especially when the core competencies of the firms are 
outsourced (Selim & Yiannakas 2000; Peursem & Jiang 
2008; Power, Bonifazi & Desouza 2004). Once sensitive 
taxpayer information leaves the confines of the IRBM, 
there is no guarantee that taxpayer security will not be 
violated. Taxpayers may not want their information to be 
sent to a third party, whose work is not directly supervised 
by IRBM. The confidentiality of material is stated under 
section 138(1) of the Act as follows:
“Subject to this section, every classified person shall regard 
and deal with classified material as confidential; and, if he is 
an official, he shall make and subscribe before the prescribed 
authority a declaration in the prescribed form that he will do 
so.”
Any return or other document made for the purposes 
of this Act and relating to the income of the taxpayer, 
and any information or other matter or thing which 
comes to the notice of IRBM shall be regarded and dealt 
as confidential material. The officer who deals with the 
material has to make a declaration in a prescribed form 
and subscribe before the prescribed authority that he will 
regard the material as confidential. If he communicates 
the material to another person or allows another person 
to have access to the material, under the law, he shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to 
a fine or imprisonment or both [section 117(1)].
This section of the Act, however, does not prevent any 
tax agent from handling the tax matters of the taxpayers. 
The classified person as stated in section 138(1) is further 
clarified in section 138(5)(c) as ‘any person advising or 
acting for a person who is or may be chargeable to tax, 
and any employee of a person so acting or advising if he 
is an employee who in his capacity as such has access to 
classified material.’ In the Tax Agent’s Code of Conduct, 
this section is also acknowledged. Only one clear 
difference is that the tax agent is normally appointed by 
the taxpayer himself whilst the external tax auditor most 
possibly is appointed by the IRBM.
However, operating in a capitalistic society and 
ultimately profit motivated, statutory protections 
regulating the outsourcing activity does not guarantee that 
external auditor will not engage in inappropriate behavior 
during audit. One of the executive has raised this issue, 
“…if the outside auditors run after taxpayers after this, 
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who is going to bear the cost between them or between 
companies?” Since the external auditor is an independent 
entity, the control mechanism would become the issue 
especially on the standardized audit procedures and the 
integrity of the tax agents. Concern over the control of 
audit procedures including the varying interpretation of 
laws and regulation is voiced out by all four executives. 
The integrity of the tax agents to provide fair treatment 
to taxpayers is considered as one of the main issues on 
disagreement to outsource the tax audit function. As 
evidence in the case of the United States, no amount of 
deterrents provided by the laws and policy will dissuade 
all private debt collectors from engaging in taxpayer abuse 
(Resnick 2005). Besides that, collaboration between the 
taxpayers with intention to evade tax and the aggressive 
tax agents would increase the level of tax non-compliance 
(Murphy 2004). Similarly, a study by Devos (2012) 
reveals the evidence that tax agents still have a significant 
influence upon taxpayers’ compliance behavior when 
more than 50 percent of them would retain the services of 
a tax agent who adopts an aggressive tax position.
TAXPAYERS’ AND TAX AGENTS’ VIEWS
In total, 75 of 265 tax agents (28.30%) and 30 of 285 
companies (10.5%) returned the questionnaires. The small 
rate is reasonable and comparable to the other taxation 
research in Malaysia using companies as respondents 
(Slemrod & Venkatesh 2002; Hijattulah & Pope 2008). 
The views from respondents are taken on the feasibility 
to implement tax audit outsourcing, the mechanism on the 
implementation and the risk and benefits associated with 
the implementation. Their perceptions on the subjects are 
based on a 5-point Likert scale.
The results are discussed separately under respondents’ 
characteristics, opinion on tax audit outsourcing and 
results of regression analysis.
Respondents’ Characteristics  Majority of tax agents 
under study have operated for more than 10 years (44%), 
followed by the agents who are working with firms 
operated between 6 to 10 years (33.3%) and the rest 
who work with firms that are less than 5 years (22.7%). 
While, majority of tax agents have working experience 
exceeding 10 years (46.7 %), the rest have about 6 to 10 
years (38.7%) and 1 to 5 years (14.6%). Additionally, 
62.7 percent tax agents are working in small size firm 
with the number of personnel less than 10 persons and 
only 1.3 percent respondents are working with firms that 
have personnel more than 50 persons. At the same time, 
most tax agents who answer the questionnaires consist of 
those who are working in firms that have only one partner 
whether audit partner or tax partner (refer to Table 1).
Most tax agents are affiliates to more than one 
professional bodies whereby Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants is the professional body that has highest 
number of members participated in this research (51 
persons), followed by Chartered Taxation Institute 
of Malaysia (43 persons), Association of Certified 
Accountants (30 persons), Malaysian Association of Tax 
Accountants (19 persons), Malaysian Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants and Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (6 persons), Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
and Administrators (4 persons) and only one person has a 
membership in Certified Public Accountant of Australia. 
The tax agents’ firms in this study offer various services 
such as tax field (96.0%), advisory service (61.3%), 
assurance (52.0%) and other services such as auditing, 
accounting, and secretarial work (18.6%).
For taxpayers group, 50 percent of the companies 
participated in this study are parent companies while 50 
percent are subsidiaries to parent company listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. There are 21 of the companies (70.0%) that have 
annual sales exceeding RM10 million and 5 companies 
(16.7%) with sales value between RM1 million and RM10 
million while the rests have sales less than RM1 million. 
Majority of the companies (70.0%) have paid-up capital 
exceeding RM10 million while 86.7 percent of them have 
between 51 and 150 employees. The number of companies 
with the experience of being tax audited by IRBM is lower 
(43.3%) than the SMEs which have never been audited 
(56.7%). There are also SMEs which not only have been 
imposed with desk and field audit but also with tax 
investigation included in the sample. The breakdown on 
industry for the vs participated in this study is as follows: 
53.3 percent in manufacturing industry, 10.0 percent in 
agriculture industry, trade and communication, 6.7 percent 
TABLE 1. Tax agents’ background
     Item Number (n = 75) Percentage
 Period of operation (year)  
  1-5 17 22.7
  6-10 25 33.3
  >10 33 44.0
 Working experience (year)  
  1-5 11 14.6
  6-10 29 38.7
  >10 35 46.7
 Number of employees  
	 	 ≥	10	 47	 62.7
  10-20 20 26.7
  20-50 7 9.3
  >50 1 1.3
 Number of audit partners   
  0 23 30.7
  1 38 50.7
  2 11 14.7
  3 2 2.7
  >3 1 1.3
 Number of tax partners  
  0 27 36.0
  1 30 40.0
  2 15 20.0
  3 2 2.7
  >3 1 1.3
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in transport, construction and information technology, and 
only 3.3 percent in finance, information technology, oil 
and gas, real estate investment trust, retailing and stock 
exchange. 
Opinion on Tax Audit Outsourcing  Generally, both 
groups of respondents agree that the outsourcing of 
tax audit works can be implemented in Malaysia. Tax 
payers have a significantly (p = 0.000) lower level of 
agreement (means = 2.81) than tax agents (mean = 3.65) 
(refer to Table 2). Outsourcing of tax audit activity also 
is able to give benefit to the interested parties in term of 
job opportunity to accountant firms or tax agent to be 
competitive in the market to grab opportunity to provide 
audit services (Cameron et al. 2004). According to Lin 
(2000), implementation of tax audit outsourced has 
given benefit to taxpayers by helping them to fulfill their 
responsibilities. It can save their time and prevent pressure 
and problems when dealing with the tax authorities. Results 
of this study indicate that both groups of respondents 
believe that the implementation of external tax audit does 
not only benefit them but also present with some elements 
of risk. For tax agents, external tax audit would give new 
business opportunity, help them to develop skillful and 
competent tax auditor, allow knowledge transfer from 
IRBM and create conducive environment to develop tax 
experts in the country. On the other hand, the tax agents 
would face a higher probability of litigation raised by 
unsatisfied clients or by IRBM if they issue misleading tax 
reports as a result of being influenced by the clients. The 
litigation cases would tarnish the image of the agents. 
TABLE 2. Agreement for tax audit outsourcing, benefits and risks
       
Item
     Tax agents     Company
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
 Agreement for tax audit outsourcing* 3.65 0.503 2.81 0.842
 Benefits of outsourcing of tax audit 3.64 0.540 3.45 0.858
 Risks of outsourcing of tax audit 3.53 0.752 3.78 0.697
 Note: *Significant at 0.00
Engaging external auditor has benefited the taxpayers 
in the following areas. They perceive that it would increase 
their voluntary compliance, improve their tax knowledge, 
avoid future penalty by IRBM, and enable them to focus 
their resources for tax and business planning. However, 
they would face the risk of being re-audited by IRBM if 
external tax auditor fails to perform tax audit as required 
by IRBM, their information would be disclosed to unrelated 
third party, incur additional compliance cost and might be 
fined by IRBM due to incompetence tax auditor.
Both taxpayers and tax agents agree that outsourcing 
should be implemented when the IRBM has limited 
resources to perform tax audit, the number of companies 
has increased, IRBM has no longer works for the interest 
of taxpayers and the non-compliance and evasion has 
increased amongst companies’ taxpayers. However, there 
are significant differences on the agreement between 
the two groups on three issues. Tax agents agree that 
outsourcing should be implemented when the number of 
companies being audited by IRBM is small (t = -2.050, 
p = 0.033) and tax audit that has been carried out by 
IRBM is not effective to curb non-compliance (t = 3.595, 
p = 0.000), while the companies’ taxpayers disagree with 
the statements. Tax agents also believe that outsourcing 
should be implemented when the tax audit activities 
as performed by IRBM are not effective to curb the 
non-compliance behaviors of the tax payers (refer to 
Table 3).
TABLE 3. Reasons for outsourcing tax audit
          
Reasons
      Tax agents     Company
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
 IRBM has limited resources to implement tax audit 3.31 0.870 3.17 1.262
 Increase of non-compliance amongst companies’ taxpayers* 3.61 0.820 3.20 1.031
 Increase in the number of companies’ taxpayers 3.27 0.759 3.20 1.095
 The number of companies have been audited is small* 3.28 0.781 2.90 1.029
 Minimum cost of tax audit 3.13 0.741 2.97 1.377
 Taxpayers believe that IRBM is not acted for their interest 3.39 0.733 3.53 1.167
 Tax audit by IRBM is not effective to curb non-compliance* 3.07 0.890 2.37 0.928
 Note: *Significant at 0.05
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The taxpayers’ disagreement to be audited by external 
auditor when only a small number of them being audited 
and the current audit work is ineffective indirectly prove 
that the intention of non-compliance may be alleviated 
by the increase in tax audit as taxpayers tend to report 
high taxable income when the probability of audit is also 
high (Pentland & Carlile 1996; Alm et al. 1992; Beck 
et al. 1991; Collins & Plumlee 1991). Both groups of 
respondents perceive that the implementation at the early 
stage should be based on voluntary basis and providing 
incentive would be helpful to increase acceptance of the 
external audit.
On the issue of cost of audit that are much discussed 
by the tax executives interviewed, taxpayers disagree with 
the outsourcing works if they have to incur the cost but 
would agree to bear the expense if it is accompanied with 
a tax deduction on the amount. They show a high level 
of agreement if the cost is borne by the tax authority. The 
tax agents tend to agree regardless of who bear the cost 
since they themselves would definitely not be burdened 
by the cost of audit. The different levels of agreements 
between both groups of respondents are significant (refer 
to Table 4). 
TABLE 4. Who should bear the cost of tax audit
       
Item
     Tax agents     Company
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
 IRBM* 3.27 1.004 4.10 1.125
 Taxpayers* 2.79 0.990 1.97 1.098
 Taxpayers with tax deduction** 3.61 0.914 3.10 1.242
 Note: *Significant at 0.00 and **significant at 0.05
Regression Analysis  This study hypothesizes that 
benefits derived from tax audit outsourcing will give 
rise to a favorable opinion of the implementation of the 
external tax audit to be exercised in Malaysia. This study 
uses multiple regression to test the relationship between 
the favorable opinion on tax audit outsourcing with it 
effects. Prior to multiple regressions testing, the data on 
possibility of tax audit outsourcing, risks and benefits of 
outsourcing for both respondents were tested for reliability 
and suitability for multiple regressions test.
The results show that there is positive relationship 
between benefits of outsourcing and their favorable 
opinion of tax audit outsourcing for both respondents 
groups. The results suggest that the more benefits gained 
by the respondents, the favorable their opinion of tax 
audit outsourcing. In term of risk, the regression produced 
contrast result for both groups of respondents in which for 
tax agent, risks have positive and significant relationship 
with a feasibility of tax audit outsourcing; whilst for 
taxpayers, risk has an insignificant positive relationship 
with their opinion on tax audit outsourcing implementation 
(see Table 5).
outsourcing regardless of the benefits and risks of the 
arrangement. Similarly, taxpayers agree to accept the 
implementation of tax audit outsourcing because of the 
benefits that they could gain from the arrangements.
CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the possibility of outsourcing the 
federal tax audit works from the views of its stakeholders 
namely tax authority, taxpayers and tax agents in Malaysia. 
Tax audit outsourcing is considered as an alternative 
for IRBM to increase its tax collection and maintain its 
revenue without introducing or implementing new taxes. 
It might also reduce tax evasion and noncompliance by 
exercising more tax audit activities through engaging the 
external auditors.
In general, the opinion of the tax authorities does 
not favor the outsourcing of tax audit. The concerns are 
mostly on the securing of the national assets as well as 
protecting and securing the taxpayers’ rights especially on 
the confidentiality of their information. The risks of the 
taxpayers being exploited by the external tax auditors also 
form part of the tax authorities’ concerns. Moreover, all of 
the executives agree that tax audit activities should be used 
moderately and mainly to promote voluntary compliance 
and to increase trust on the tax office.
The finding from the questionnaire indicates that tax 
agents and taxpayers believe that it is feasible to outsource 
federal tax audit in Malaysia, recognizing the benefits that 
could be gained from it. For tax agents, they believe that 
while federal tax audit outsourcing has benefits and risks 
but they hold favorable opinion on its implementation in 
Malaysia. This is justifiable considering the new service 
would generate income to their practice. Meanwhile, 
TABLE 5. Results of multiple regressions
      Tax agents    Taxpayers
	Variables	 Β	 Sig.	P	 β	 Sig.	p
	Benefits	(χ1) 0.422 0.000* 0.814 0.000*
	Risks	(χ2) 0.284 0.006* 0.037 0.744
Note: R2 for tax agents = 0.550, R2 for taxpayers = 0.812, and 
*significant at 0.05
 From the results we can conclude that tax agents 
are willing to accept the implementation of tax audit 
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for corporate taxpayers, federal tax audit outsourcing 
is acceptable given the benefits. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the idea to implement the federal tax 
audit outsourcing cannot be simply rejected and should 
be opened for further discussion. Both the respondents 
groups in this study represent two major stakeholders 
in implementation of the tax audit outsourcing, and thus 
carry considerable weight in the decision on whether to 
implement the tax audit outsourcing. As such, identified 
benefits have becoming a consideration to most 
organizations to use outsourcing services.
This study provides an alternative strategy to the 
tax authority to secure government revenue through 
outsourcing of tax audit to independent auditors without 
having to invest in other assets or personnel. This 
approach is also expected to reduce the workload of the 
tax authorities and may assist firms in meeting their tax 
obligation.
This study however has its limitations. The low 
response rate particularly for the taxpayers group may 
prevent findings from this study to be generalized to the 
population of taxpayers in Malaysia. Another limitation is 
the lack of reference related to federal tax audit outsourcing 
resulting in the researchers unable to deeply understand 
the practice of federal tax audit outsourcing and rely on 
other literature such as outsourcing literature. Future 
research on feasibility of federal tax audit outsourcing 
implementation should be conducted incorporating the 
views of the tax authorities and corporate taxpayers from 
the large private companies or public listed companies to 
obtain more complete views on the matter.
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